addition to the entrapment defense, an individual who has been encouraged to commit a crime by law enforcement officials can allege that the government's conduct was so outrageous that it violated his due process rights. 32 This section of the note will examine the evolution of these defenses to determine how they applied to the ABSCAM scenario.
A. Entrapment
The defense of entrapment. is rooted firmly in the American criminal justice system. 33 Traditionally, there have been two tests which courts have employed to determine whether an individual has been entrapped: the subjective test and the objective test. The subjective test, which has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court 34 and most state courts, 35 fOcuses on the predisposition of the accused in determining whether entrapment occurred. 36 Predisposition is determined by examining whether the defendant. was already prone to commit the act. for which the government merely supplied the opportunity, or whether the government persuaded an otherwise innocent. person to commit the crime. 37 In contrast to the subjective approach, an objective test fOr entrapment has been advocated by several Supreme Court justices, 38 and by numerous commentators,39 but has been employed in only a small number of state courts." In the objective test, the concern is not with the predisposition of the particular defendant, but with the conduct of the government officials and the degree of instigation or inducement.' That is, the court must look to the scope of government influence as it would affect the "average person" 42 and ignore the accused's subjective state of mind." The development of these two tests deserves attention.
The subjective test has been the sole test applied by the United States Supreme Court in four landmark entrapment cases beginning with Sotreiit v. United States:" In Sorrells, a government agent convinced the defendant to sell him a hall' gallon of whiskey.' 5 After being indicted for possession and sale of' whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act, the defendant pleaded not guilty and asserted the defense of entrapment." The Supreme Court, relying on statutory interpretation"' and lower court precedent," determined that "a sense of justice" did not allow for otherwise innocent people to be "lured" into the commission of crimes by government officials and then to be punished as if they had been predisposed to commit the act." Thus the defendant was found to be not. guilty based on entrapment. As such, the predisposition of the defendant became the Supreme Court's test for entrapment.
The Supreme Court also addressed the entrapment defense in Sherman v. United
States." In Sherman, government officials arrested an individual whom they had coaxed, through a government informer, into selling narcotics to that informer. 51 Although the Court found entrapment to have existed," it did so strictly by evaluating the accused's subjective state of mind which manifested both hesitancy and lack of predisposition.53 Furthermore, because neither of the parties raised the issue, the Court refused to amend the doctrine of entrapment in light of the objective theory."' Thus, the subjective theory remained ruling law. In the two remaining Supreme Court entrapment cases, the defendants specifically [Vol. 25:351 asked the Court to reconsider the entrapmenttheory as set forth in Sorrel's and Sherman in terms of certain fundamental principles of due process. In United States v. Russell,"
government agents supplied an illicit drug manufacturer with an essential narcotic ingredient and then arrested him for the subsequent manufacture and sale of the drug. 56
Refusing to overturn the long-standing subjective theory precedents of Sorrel's and Sherman," the Russell Court applied the subjective standard of entrapment to the facts of the case, and held that the defendant was clearly predisposed to commit the crime and, accordingly, denied the claim of ent•apment."
The Court arrived at a similar holding in the more recent case of Hampton v. United States." In Hampton, petitioner was arrested after participating in an illegal drug sale arranged by a government informant." Although the defendant claimed entrapment, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction."' In an opinion reminiscent of Russell, the Hampton Court ruled out the possibility that a claim of entrapment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct if the predisposition of the defendant has been established. 62 Thus, the subjective theory of entrapment continued to be the appropriate test despite suggested alternatives.
The objective test for entrapment is the primary alternative test which has been advocated in the concurring or dissenting opinions of each of these four Supreme Court cases. The origins of the objective test can be traced to Justice Roberts' concurring opinion in Sorrel's."' Justice Roberts foresaw problems associated with the use of the subjective test. He maintained that the danger existed that a defendant's predisposition to commit. the crime could be determined erroneously by reliance on the defendant's prior reputation or acts." Justice Roberts, therefore, claimed that the proper test for entrapment should not be predisposition, but the conduct of the government officials and the degree of the instigation and inducement." Similarly, in Sherman, justice Frankfurter warned that despite the defendant's past crimes and general predisposition, the defendant might not have committed these particular crimes."" He also felt that an "objective test" of entrapment was necessary to regulate police conduct." The dissents in Russell" and Hampton" echoed these concerns and advocated the adoption of the "objective lest."
Despite such advocacy, the objective view of entrapment has remained only a minority view.
B. Due Process
Although in both Russell and Hampton the Supreme Court. reaffirmed the subjective test For entrapment, the Court considered the notion that the government's conduct as 411 U.S. 423 (1973) . could be so outrageous that it would constitute a violation of the defendant's due process rights." The Russell Court determined that "we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 71 The Court emphasized, however, that "the instant case is not of that breed." 72 Although the Hampton Court refused to consider the appropriateness of the government's conduct," the concurring and dissenting Justices addressed the issue.
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Powell and joined by Justice Blackmun,'" maintained that although the subjective test stood," a defendant found to be predisposed could claim that outrageous government conduct violated his due process rights.'" The concurring Justices found, however, that. the government conduct in this case was not outrageous." The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall,'" stated that the objective test was proper and that predisposition did not matter." In examining the facts of the case, the dissent concluded that the government conduct was outrageous enough to require dismissal." Thus, a majority of the Justices in Hampton found that, although predisposition is the test for entrapment, even a predisposed defendant may be released if' there is outrageous government conduct because such conduct is a due process violation. "quite independent of the crimes the defendants committed."' This conduct, the court found, was completely reprehensible," and the court added that it hoped that the "lesson of this case -would obviate the necessity for any case to reach them which would specifically require the court to find that the government conduct violated clue process of law."
Following the Archer opinion, the United Stales Court. of Appeals for the Third Circuit., in United Slates v. Twigg" held that the government's conduct was outrageous and violated the defendant's due process rights." Twigg involved the arrest of two illicit drug manufacturers to whom government agents had furnished essential chemicals, equipment, materials and an entire farmhouse/laboratory for manufacturing certain narcotics." Considering the defendant's claim of entrapment, the court adhered to precedent and determined that predisposition was the sole basis For disproving entrapment ,! )2 The court concluded that this defendant was, in fact, predisposed." The Twigg court then examined whether the government's conduct was outrageous and found that the police involvement was so overreaching that it barred prosecution as a matter of due process. 9' In reaching this decision, the court weighed the extent of government. conduct. to determine where predisposition ended and government inducement. took over. 95 Emphasizing that the government initiated the plan, supplied otherwise Unavailable ingredients and took advantage of the weakness of the defendants," the Twigg court concluded that the government actions "reached 'a demonstrable level of out rageousness.' "7 Consequently, the court held that the extensive police involvement violated the defendant's due process rights." Twigg, therefore, stands for the proposition that government conduct can reach a level so outrageous that it warrants dismissal of criminal charges on due process grounds.
From the foregoing discussion of case law, two conclusions may he drawn. First, the subjective test of entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition, is the only Supreme Court approved test for entrapment. Second, even with a predisposed defendant, government conduct may be sufficiently outrageous to support a defense of' violation of due process. Keeping these conclusions in mind, it is necessary to examine the individual ABSCAM scenarios and evaluate their holdings in light of' both the adequacy of the predisposition test, and the consideration given government conduct.
II. THE ABSCAM SCENARIOS AND DEFENSES
Each time a middleman brought an unsuspecting official into the ABSCAM investigation, one of four distinguishable scenarios was begun. These scenarios were: first, the 86 It at 675. These crimes included perjury before judges and grand juries, misleading a police investigation, and "needlessly injecting the federal government into a matter of state concern." Id. at 672. Id. at 377.
basic and most common, the "asylum scenario";" second, the more complicated version, the "stock and loan scenario";'°° third, the fact pattern with which the courts had the least trouble returning a guilty verdict, the "Alexandro scenario"; 101 and finally, a slight, but distinguishable variation of the asylum scenario, the "Kelly scenario." 1 " 2
A. The Asylum Scenario
The simplest and most common approach used by the FBI was the "asylum scenario."
In this scenario, the unsuspecting middlemen contacted influential public officials and introduced them to undercover FBI agents who offered the officials cash in exchange for assurances of action on the sheik's behalf in immigration matters.'" Each time the agents made an offer, they phrased it slightly differently and promised different amounts of money depending on the importance of the individual.
George X. Schwartz and Harry P. jannoni, both influential members of the Philadelphia City Council, were informed that the sheik was interested in building an elaborate hotel complex in Philadelphia.'" The FBI offered them money, assuring them that acceptance of the money would be an expression to the sheik ()I' their "friendliness,"'" as well as an assurance that the councilmen would use their official positions to expedite completion ot' the hotel complex.'" Subsequently, the councilmen accepted the money.'" Both men were indicted and eventually convicted of bribery and related crimes.'" A Of the six major defendants who were indicted under the "asylum scenario," only three chose to allege entrapment. 121 Two of those defendants, Jannotti and Schwartz, were successful with the defense in the district con rt." 2 The court first determined that the subjective test of predisposition was the appropriate standard for entrapment. 123 Under this test, the court observed the proper way to determine the existence of predisposition was to see if the government induced the defendants to commit a crime they would not have been likely to commit otherwise. 12 ' Analyzing the facts at hand, the Jannotti court. concluded that the government agents had offered inducements that were so au ractive, that the mere acceptance of the money did not prove predisposition.'" The court based this conclusion on three factors. First, the $10,000 and $30,000 gifts were "a substantial temptation to commit a first. offense."'" Second, the defendants, by agreeing to help in the construction of the hotel complex, bad done nothing inconsistent with their obligations as members of the City Council." 7 Third, the government agents had led the defendants to believe that if they did not accept the money, the hotel project would not. come to Philadelphia. 128 This evidence, the court maintained, was insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish the defendants' predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Consequently, the court held that the defendants were entrapped.' 3° Furthermore, in discussing a possible due process violation, the court, referring to both the Twigg and Archer decisions, 13 t weighed the importance of apprehending corrupt public officials against the 116 Id. " 7 Id. at 1214. The "sheik's representatives" offered Murphy a monetary sum in return for an assurance from Murphy that he would "meet with them." Id. As a result of the failure on Murphy's part to commit his Congressional interests and services to the sheik the jury found him not guilty of bribery. Id. His acceptance of the money, however, as well as his request for financing from the sheik to acquire a Puerto Rican shipping company led the jury to return guilty verdicts for criminal gratuity, conflict of interest and conspiracy. Id 79 Id. at 600. The district court had been impressed by the defendant's argument that the sheik's representatives had insisted that the money was not to be used in exchange for the councilman's vote, but rather, as a comfort for the sheik's "Arab mind" which they claimed could lint trust a man until that man accepted a large sum of the sheik's money. equally unsuccessful with their defense strategies.'" These strategies included defenses of objective entrapment "8 and clue process violations, 149 using the latter to attack both the general nature and the specific operations of ABSCAM. In each case, the Myers court rejected the objective theory of entrapment based on "clear federal precedents that reject objective entrapment." 15° Furthermore, the court denied the due process defense because it believed the government conduct fell far short of "outrageousness."'" The court maintained that ABSCAM merely set out a "honey pot' and, at any time, the defendants could have refused, as did three legislators.'" The court also determined that the government conduct was less extensive than in Hampton,'" a case where the Supreme '" Id. TheJannotti court noted that in Hampton activity by the government on both "sides" of an illegal narcotics sale in supplying the defendant with heroin and then arranging for an FBI agent to buy it was not outrageous. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, activity on one side, as when government agents offer money to politicians, "may not be outrageous, either." Id. The court emphasized that "a closer analogy to Hampton would be it' the FBI, in order to prosecute middlemen Crider and Errichen.i, had not only offered them bribe money, but also supplied them with "undercover"
Congressmen to accept the bribe." Id. at 1225-26 n.15. This does not, however, justify the court's a fortiori conclusions regarding the bribery of Congressmen because this is an act which, by its very nature, cannot have the government working on "both sides" because one side must be the unsuspecting Congressman.
'" See supra notes 73-SO and accompanying text.
' 5° United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1229.
were perhaps as reliable as any trial could ever hope to be.'" Due process violations and entrapment, therefore, were not found in any of the "asylum scenario" cases.
B. The "Stock and Loan" Scenario
A slightly more complicated scheme led to the indictments and convictions of former United States Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey. Camden Mayor Errichetti, acting as middleman, set up an "investment. group" which included himself, Senator Williams, and four others.'" According to Errichetti, the purpose of the group was to organize a titanium mine and a processing plant.'" The group approached the FBI agents in an attempt to obtain $100 million in financing from the sheik.'" Senator Williams met with unidentified FBI agents posing as the sheik and his representatives on seven occasions.' 61 During the last of these meetings, Senator Williams actually refused a cash payment which was offered in exchange for his assistance in the sheik's immigration to the United States.' 62 Despite this refusal, the jury found that, at previous meetings with the sheik, Williams had agreed to use his position as Senator to obtain government contracts for titanium in exchange for the sheik's financial backing of the mine.' 63 Thus, the jury found Williams guilty of several bribery related crimes.' 64
At trial, Senator Williams alleged both entrapment and due process defenses,'" neither with any success.'" Williams' entrapment defense was based on what he considered insufficient evidence of prediposition to accept bribes,'" and a. lack of prior suspicion on the part of the investigators.'" The district court disagreed, however, holding that the evidence at Williams' trial was sufficient to convince a jury of the Senator's predisposition.'" Moreover, the district court stated that the government did not need to suspect an individual of criminal activity to initiate an investigation.' 7" Senator Williams' argument that government officials violated his due process rights by their outrageous conduct included four points: First, Senator Williams alleged that the FBI "coached" him into saying and doing as he had before the video cameras. 17 ' Second, the agents used certain on-camera verbal ploys which inierrupted his explanations of why he was refusing the bribe.'" Third, an internal FBI memorandum existed which concluded 137 Id. at 1229-30. Williams, and all the ABSCAN1 defendants were singled out for investigation because they were supporters of then Presidential candidate Senator Edward . Kennedy. 17 " The district court rejected all these allegations, asserting that either they were completely unsupported by evidence or that, even if the allegations were true, they did not deny the defendant any "fundamental fairness" or similar "due process requirements."i 7 ' Neither entrapment nor a clue process violation, therefore, existed in the stock-and-loan scenario,
The third scheme employed by the FBI resulted in the conviction of a criminal investigator with the Immigration and Naturalization Service name Alexander Alexandro, jr."" Alexandro came to the FBI's attention through an unsuspecting middleman named Alfred Carpentier, a Long Island businessman.'" Carpentier originally met with FBI agents at one of the sheik's lavish parties and advised them that he and Alexandro would help the sheik obtain a "green card" which was necessary for the sheik's immigration to the United States. 178 Rather than involve the sheik, the FBI agents requested that Alexandro obtain a green card for an Irish alien friend of the sheik. 179 Alexandra, thereafter, took complete control of the scenario, concocting an elaborate and highly illegal scheme involving a contrived marriage and subsequent divorce for the alien in order to obtain the necessary documents.'" Alexandro then met with the sheik's representatives before hidden cameras, explained his elaborate plan in full detail, quoted a price of $15,000 and received an initial payment of $2,000 from an agent.'"' Alexandro was eventually arrested, indicted and convicted on three criminal counts.'" Alexander Alexandro simply alleged that the government's actions violated his clue process rights,'" apparently because his complete acquiescence in the criminal activities in which he took part foreclosed any claim of entrapment.'" Ater considering the facts of the case, the court concluded that not only did the facts show a complete lack of coercion '" Id. at 1100. The memorandum stated that, because Senator Williams had not accepted a bribe, certain FBI officials believed that there was no case against him. Id. The court maintained t hat an internal memorandum evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a case did not preclude the government from proceeding with its investigation. Id on the part of the government 1 R 5 but that Alexandro's conduct demonstrated the exact type of elusive, difficult-to-detect covert crime which justifies undercover government activities.'" The most incriminating element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario from the other ABSCAM cases was that Alexandra, himself, became the "driving and persistent force behind the intricate scheine."" 7 Alexandra's conduct made it unnecessary for the government to engage in any arguably unconstitutional activity.'" Thus, no due process violation or entrapment existed in the Alexandra scenario.
D. The Kelly Scenario
The final variation in the ABSCAM investigation involved a former United States Representative, Richard Kelly of Florida,'" and contains several details which distinguished it from the other three scenarios.
Certain facts were well established due to electronic recording devices.'" The evidence indicated that Kelly became involved in ABSCAM through three middlemen, more than had been used to involve any other ABSCAM defendant."' The FBI agents initially met with businessman William Rosenberg and expressed their desire to recruit Congressmen."' Rosenberg contacted an accountant and friend, Stanley Weisz, who mentioned this proposition to his longtime business associate Eugene Citazio. 193 Ciuzio approached one of the FBI agents and convinced him that he would be able to influence Congressman Kelly."' Consequently, the FB1 agents described to Ciuzio the standard ABSCAM proposition: a very attractive investment by the sheik in the Congressman's district, and money in return for help with the sheik's immigration concerns.'" Ciuzio agreed and contacted Kelly with the sheik's proposal.'" At trial, Kelly testified that he was interested only in the legitimate investment aspect of the deal, which he claimed he had made clear to Ciuzio." 7 Nevertheless, at a subsequent meeting, an FB1 agent offered Kelly $25,000 as an initial payment. on a $100,000 bribe for his assistance with immigration matters.'" Kelly refused the offer twice and the agent left. the room to speak with a government attorney who was monitoring the meeting in the basement.'" Although their conversation was only vaguely recalled,"° the attorney told the agent that Kelly was merely "being cute." 20 ' After meeting with the attorney, the agent returned to Kelly, Emphasizing that testing virtue of those previously unsuspected of criminal activity is an unacceptable form of law enforcement,'" the district court maintained that, at best, this type of police work results in "prosecution for the sake of prosecution."'" Assuming, arguendri, that this is permissible, the court continued, the temptations offered by the FBI must not exceed those which a politician ordinarily would encounter. 200 The court maintained that this limit was well exceeded in the Kelly scenario. 209 Emphasizing that the agents continued to offer the bribe to Congressman Kelly after he had rejected it twice,'" the court reasoned that, in the "real world," no criminal would persist with such an offer for fear of his own apprehension.'" Although the court expressed deep chagrin that the defendant eventually did take the money, 2 ' 2 it determined that the government's persistent battle with the defendant's conscience rose above the level of offensiveness to that of "outrageousness," 2 " This outrageousness, the court concluded, exceeded the bounds of law enforcement. 2 l 4 In effect, this deviation from "real-world constraints" shifted the criminal motivation from the defendant's predisposition to the government's outrageous conduct. 210 The court maintained that Kelly was "made into a criminal by his own government."'" As such, the district. court dismissed the indictment.'" The government. appealed the Kelly decision to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.
of Appeals which reinstated the guilty verdicts. 218 Reviewing the case solely on due process' grounds,'" the circuit court rejected the district. court's "real world" lest of government over-inducement.. 2 " While the district court reasoned that no real criminal would persist with a bribe offer for fear of apprehension 2 21 the circuit court alternatively stated that Congressman Kelly was in no way taken aback by the initial offer and, 202 N. at 1468, n.48. The court maintained that. Kelly never aggressively pursued his claim of entrapment and that, although the jury did consider the entrapment defense, the district court did not specifically hold that Kelly had been entrapped as a matter of law. Id. therefore, the offer was within Kelly's "real world.'" 222 The court then discussed ABSCAM in both general and specific terms so as to develop its own due process test.
The circuit court compared government involernent in ABSCAM to the Russell and Hampton drug cases . 223 The court maintained that, in Russell and Hampton, the government provided both the opportunity and the means to commit a crime, but that no due process violation was held to exist in either case. 224 The court determined that, therefore, no tine process violation could exist in ABSCAM where the government provided merely the opportunity, and not the means, to commit a crime. 225 The court then discussed the specific claims which Kelly asserted in his defense. First, regarding the lack of any prior suspicion of Kelly by the government, the court found that ABSCAM operatives did have evidence, prior to the bribe offer, that Kelly was "fully aware that he was participating in an illicit transaction,""G and from which they could conclude that "Kelly was, in fact, corrupt ." 227 Second, regarding the use of convicted felon Weinberg, his compensation, 228
and his failure to record every conversation which he had held with Kelly's middlemen, the court held that these facts were adequately considered by the trial jury and that Kelly failed to explain how these factors would have added "anything of significance" to his defense. 229 Finally, regarding the multiple bribe offers which distinguished this scenario from the others, the court reexamined Kelly's initial refusals and characterized them not as rejections of bribes themselves, but as rejections of the manner in which the bribe was to be paid.'" The court held, therefore, that the government had actually made only one bribe offer, which Kelly accepted, and for which he should be found guilty.'
The circuit court in Kelly concluded with a second opinion filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.'" In it, the court stated that, although the "real-world" test of the district court was speculative, the circuit court 'night have applied it in Kelly, if "the slate were clear." 233
In or her words, the court was bound by precedent not to "alter the contours of the entrapment defense under a clue process cloak.'" The court added that "without. [Vol. 25:351 of the public officials, in their entrapment and due process claims, denied that they had committed the acts of which they were accused. Rather, they claimed that certain extenuating circumstances required dismissal of their cases. Whether they claimed traditional entrapment or the more vague notion of a due process violation, it is evident that.
they were attempting to redirect the attention of the court to the conduct of the government.. Each defendant net with differing degrees of success, ranging from Alexandro, whom the court believed was just grasping for straws, to Kelly, Schwartz, and jannoni, with whom at least their respective district courts agreed. The broad spectrum of resolutions seems a result of more than just differing fact patterns. It seems to be due to a variety of different, and often contradictory views, on the part of judges and juries, about how the appropriate law should be applied to the facts of the ABSCAM scenarios. It is the purpose of the next section of this note, therefore, to reexamine the theories of entrapment and clue process, to discern how they should be applied to the crime of political corruption.
Ill. THE FAILURE OF THE ABSCAM DEFENSES
Having examined the four ABSCAM scenarios, it is evident that the defendants in each had it difficult time presenting their respective defenses. In fact, none succeeded to the point of acquittal. This section of this note will submit that the failure of these defenses had less to do with the merits of the cases than with t he manner in which the FBI structured the scenarios. This contention will be advanced through a reevaluation of modern entrapment and due process law as they pertain to t he ABSCAM scenarios. The examination of entrapment will demonstrate the insufficiency of the subjective theory as a defense for ABSCAM defendants in light of the particular structure of the ABSCAM scenarios. The examination will also take into account the unavailability of the objective theory as a defense, due to the clear federal precedents which have discarded this alternative theory. Then, the examination of due process will investigate the refusal of most ABSCAM courts to allow this defense, apparently due to a lack of precedents and standards, and its likeness to the unsuccessful objective theory of entrapment,
A. Entrapment
Theoretically, entrapment occurs when an "unwary innocent, -as opposed to an "unwary criminal," is apprehended. 2 " Traditionally, emrapment is limited to "victimless crimes" such as bribery, gambling, prostitution, and contraband sales. It is difficult for the government to prosecute such crimes because t here are no victims to come forward and testify."' Thus, the government often resorts to undercover schemes to apprehend individuals committing such crinies. 239 Moreover, in any crime where t here is a victim, or where someone else's rights are endangered, police may not create opportunities for the commission of these crimes."' The police cannot, for example, create opportunities for someone to commit burglary, rape, or murder . " because in those cases, the police would not merely be instigators, they would also be accomplices. In ABSCAM, the "crime" involved was bribery. Entrapment, therefore, potentially could exist. Entrapment would exist if, in offering the bribe, a government offiCial afforded the suspect not only the opportunity to commit a crime, but also instigated or induced its commission by one not ready or willing to commit it."' Thus, in evaluating the entrapment defense, courts must determine whether the crime was a result of the defendant's willingness, or the government's creativity and instigation. 243 Because of the Supreme Court precedent, all the ABSCA NI courts made this determination through the subjective test of predisposition."' Due to the facts of the ABSCAM investigation, the subjective test was not too easy to apply. An individual's predisposition is only apparent in extreme situations. At one end of the spectrum is a Congressman who may have offered his unsolicited services to the sheik for certain sums, and at the other, is a Congressman who simply may have refused all offers. Any fact pattern that falls within these extremes requires a more detailed evaluation of the facts of the case to determine if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.
One of the few actual enumerations of available standards for determining predisposition was advocated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Becker. 245 This test, which the Myers court employed to the disadvantage of Congressman Lederer,"" involves three factors for proving predisposition: first, an existing course of similar criminal conduct; second, the accused's already formed design to commit the crime or similar crimes; and third, his willingness to do so as evidenced by ready compliance."' Although these three factors are aimed at determining whether a defendant had a predisposition to commit the crimes,"" there are difficulties in applying the factors to the facts of a case. It may be difficult for a court to examine character evidence without convicting individuals on the basis of past criminal conduct.249 Such an examination might run into opposition from evidence rules250 and could result in a constitutionally unsavory outcome for the case. 2 " Also the willingness factor, which the Myers court emphasized, allows a jury to place tremendous weight on the actual commission of the crime. 252 This, too is unaccept- able, since the acceptance of money, in and of itself', cannot prove predisposition to bribery. If' it could, subjective entrapment would never exist; to accept the money would prove guilt and to refuse it would imply that there was no criminal act. The subjective test is inequitable in the ABSCAM scenarios because of four factors: the use of videotape; the lack of prior suspicion and the use of random targets; the mixture of legal offers with illegal bribes; and the involvement of unsuspecting middlemen. Each of these elements will now be discusseed.
The FBI's use of videotape to establish the ABSCAM defendants' criminal predisposition hindered a reliable determination of such predisposition. Videotape, by its nature, is compelling evidenc.e. 253 The Myers court went so far as to say that thanks to videotape evidence, these trials were as reliable as any criminal trials could ever hope to be. 254
Admittedly, videotape is a reliable form of evidence for reproducing and proving physical happenings, 255 but for proving predisposition, its reliability is limited considerably by its inability to photograph a defendant's "state of mind." 25 ' One study has determined that. "when untrained observers rely on nonverbal information, they are unable to distinguish reliably between when a person is lying and when he or she is telling the truth." Id. Videotape has its effect on information offered to the jury by presenting a narrowed visual field, electronic and photographic distortion, loss of detail and a selective content. Doret Proof of predisposition was also complicated by the manner in which the FBI selected its targets. This complication resulted from the lack of any previous suspicion on the part of the government that the target was engaged in illegal activities, 24 " This is particularly important to the notion of predispositiOn because in the Supreme Court cases holding that the defendants were predisposed, testimony indicated that the investigating agents had some reason to suspect that the defendants had either dealt in the past, or were dealing presently in corn rztband. 2 " In the ABSCAM scenarios, conversely, there was a complete lack of any previous suspicion on the part of investigating officials. 265
As a result, the government structured it.s proof of the defendants' predisposition around the commission of the crime which was captured dramatically on videotape. The government presented no testimony alluding to any prior illegal behavior. The lack of such testimony was an apparent flaw in the government's case. Nonetheless, jurors presented with mere oral testimony regarding the defendants' good character, and law abiding propensities, might find videotape of the defendant accepting large sums of money overwhelming proof of predisposition. In this way, the random selection process employed by A BSCAM agents resulted in further detriment to a defense of entrapment tinder the subject.ive test.'"
Another source of confusion in determining whether the defendants were predisposed emanated from the nature of the offers made to the defendants which included a combination of legal, community-serving investments, and illegal bribes. This mixture made it difficult to determine predisposition by confusing the defendants and the courts.
The offers confused the defendants by containing elements that. benefited both their own interests and those of their constituencies. Councilmen Jannotti and Schwartz, for example, argued that they were concerned with the best interests of their constituencies, 267 and therefore their predisposition was not solely their own. In addition, the defendants may have been confused about whether they were accepting offers which were actually legitimate, or ones which were obviously criminal."' Furthermore, attempts to clarity the situation through some form of 'verbal insulation" 2 " 9 served only to increase the insidiousness of the events by attempting to justify morally clearly illegal acts. Because of this combination of legal and illegal offers, actual intent-to-commit-crime was often muddled in the minds of the defendants and predisposition became unclear.
The combined offers may also have been confusing to judges and juries. As complicated as it was for the defendants to be able to distinguish between 'legitimate and illegitimate offers, the confusion was compounded when a court was asked to view isolated videotaped conversations and to make not only those judgments, but also to determine the defendant's true motivations and predisposition, judgments even the defendants must have found difficult to make. Furthermore, courts were presented with the illegal aspect of the offer without any comparable evidence of the meetings between targets and middlemen where clearly legitimate offers were made,'" In this way, the mere appearance of the defendants at the videotaped meetings may have seemed to indicate predisposition to accept illegal bribes, even though the defendant may have believed there was no criminal intent whatsoever. Accordingly, the use of legitimate inducements combined with illegal bribes, served to make a determination of a defendant's predisposition more difficult.
The final problem in determining predisposition, and the one which has actually attracted the most intense scrutiny, was ABSCAM's use of middlemen."' The purpose of middlemen was to help the agents find public officials who would assist the sheik. 272 This tactic, however, produced several problems. First, because these middlemen were offered a fraction of all monies eventually accepted by the politicians, the middlemen had an incentive to approach as many officials as they could. 273 Although the agents were instructed to turn away any officials if there was some question about whether they would accept an illegal offer,274 the middlemen were never so instructed. These middlemen, therefore, still had an incentive to make legitimate offers to the politicians, in the hopes that the politicians later would accept an illegal offer from the sheik's representatives. 275 In this way, the middlemen may have attracted politicians who initially were not predisposed to accept illegal offers. Perhaps the most offensive example of this problem was middleman Eugene Ciuzio who convinced the FBI agents that he had "virtual control" over Congressman Kelly and could persuade him to accept a bribe. 27 " None of Ciuzio's assertions were true. 277
Additionally, because middlemen rather than undercover agents were employed to induce the officials, there was a chance that the middlemen, who would profit from the officials' accepting the bribe, would supplement or completely fabricate the inducements offered by the government agents. 278 More dangerously, because middlemen were used to contact politicians initially, judges and jurors were presented with video evidence of the FBI/target meetings and only oral testimony regarding what occurred during the guilt or else it would "provide a corrupt politician easy insurance against any undercover investiga- middlemen target meetings. 279 It is precisely this type of evidence, however, which could play a crucial role in determining whether the defendants were predisposed. Thus, the lack of any reliable evidence of these early meetings seems to constitute a potential prejudice which even the most legitimate entrapment defense could not withstand.
In the ABSCAM scenarios, the predisposition of the defendants was difficult to ascertain. The videotape evidence of the physical act of the commission of the crime was one source of this difficulty. In addition, the absence of any reason to suspect the defendants of prior illegal activity, as well as the minimal or confusing testimony of the middlemen made the determination of predisposition difficult. Videotape evidence of the physical commission of' a crime is not a reliable indicator of predisposition, yet the dramatic nature of such evidence may lead a jury to regard it as conclusive proof of predisposition. When the subjective test for entrapment is used, the effect of the videotaped evidence on the factfinder may make proving entrapment difficult.
As a result of the failure of the subjective theory, a variety of scholars, 2 s° legislators,28 ' courts, 2 " 2 and Supreme Court. justices, 283 have advocated the alternative, objective theory. Many of the. arguments made in support of the objective test are actually criticisms of the subjective test. 284 It is argued that predisposition is a test for which there are no workable, non-prejudicial stanclards; 2 " that predisposition allows for the admission of evidence of the accused's character, reputation and past criminal concluct; 2 " that it is particularly unfair to the second offender who must deny predisposition in spite of his past act; 287 and that it may even involve a denial of equal protection of the law. 2 " Furthermore, it has been alleged that because the subjective test avoids any consideration of police conduct, it ignores a basic function of the entrapment defense: to deter improper police conduct. 2 " 9 Control over police tactics is a responsibility to which a defendant's predisposition is completely irrevelant. Along with the need for deterrence, which has been a vital force behind the push for a uniform entrapment test, 29° an important potential benefit of the objective standard is the protection of the "purity of the judicial 2" See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Objective, supra note 284, at 336. Given two defendants in identical situations a court or jury may find one defendant was entrapped because he has no prior criminal record, but find that the other defendant was not entrapped because of a prior record of totally unrelated criminal activity. Id. [Vol. 25:351
Frankfurter in Sherman, 293 insures the public that its law enforcement officials and its courts will continue to "formulate and apply 'proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts,' "29' a protection not offered under the predisposition test. Despite this impressive undercurrent. favoring the objective test of entrapment, and despite the particular ABSCAM-related problems existing because of the use of the subjective test, clear federal precedent still requires that the subjective test be applied.' 95 Considering the benefits which the objective theory seems to avail to defendants in general, it is necessary to examine the advantages which the theory would afford the ABSCAM defendant. With the objective theory, a reviewing court's emphasis shifts from the conduct of the defendant to that. of the government. 29" As such, many of the problems the ABSCAM defendants faced under the subjective test become less severe. Because "outrageous government conduct," unlike predisposition, does not involve intent, or the defendant's state of mind, physical evidence such as videotape becomes much more reliable. Similarly, because the objective test relies on a reasonable man standard, as opposed to the defendant's predisposition, the courts are not confronted by the problems that were encountered regarding character testimony, evidence of past crimes, and the possibility of confusion on the part of the defendant. 297 Rather, judges and jurors need only determine how the reasonable man would react to the actual, physical conduct which the government clearly displayed on the videotape, a decision whose resolution will not.
depend on prior suspicion, combination offers or irresponsible middlemen. Therefore, not only are the problems peculiar to videotaped evidence itself resolved, but the employment. of such evidence reaches the high levels of reliability for which it was designed. The methods of proof" would no longer involve subjective, state of mind, character evaluations, but rather, objective, physical, conduct evaluations. The videotape evidence so important to the ABSCAM investigation seems, therefore, to be a perfect complement to the objective test of entrapment. Unfortunately, as long as the subjective theory remains ruling precedent, the objective I heory will he beyond the reach of entrapment defendants.
B. Due Process
Although the objective theory of entrapment proved to be of no avail to ABSCAM defendants, courts did examine whether government conduct may have been outrageous through the defendants' due process argument. Like the defense of objective entrapment, this defense focused not on the defedant's state of mind, but on the actions of the policing agents. These actions could conceivably become so outrageous that they would he the sole cause of the crime, thus overstepping permissible police conduct and denying the defendant's due process rights. Several judges have warned of the possibility that the due process defense could become merely a reworking of the unacceptable objective 292 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring The lower Kelly court also attempted to expose such improprieties as ABSCAM's ability to punish . both criminally and politically.'3 i ' In the post-Watergate American society, even if a politician were to be fully acquitted, his career undoubtedly would be ruined, if not because his constituency watched him accepting a bribe on the evening news, certainly because he had spent considerable amounts of time, money and energy on a long and painful tria1. 316 But although Congressmen do have certain, ostensibly jobrelated, privileges' that other citizens do not, they are by no means citizens above suspicion. It is highly unlikely that any court would seriously consider the notion that the Constitution presents Congressmen with any special due process rights, either to be a Congressman, to be immune from investigation or to be free from the political ramifications of such investigations.
In summary, the ABSCAM courts almost universally held that the ABSCAM investigations did not violate the due process rights of the defendants. Although this finding may be due more to the lack of precedent, the vagueness of due process standards and the similarity of the due process defense to objective entrapment than to the actual degree of the government conduct, the mandate of a majority of the courts is clear. The conduct of the ABSCAM agents did not reach a level so outrageous that it should require dismissal of the case. Despite this mandate, several judges, and even the federal government have spoken out against the manner in which the FBI conducted the ABSCAM investigalion . 3 " These statements, as well as those of Congress and the United Slates Attorney General's office will be examined in the final section of This article. That section will also reevaluate ABSCAM and make suggestions regarding the Si ructure, purpose and merits of similar investigations for the future.
IV, ABSCAM's FuTuRr, IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the ABSCAM investigation was the identification and eradication of corruption in government. It was successful in that almost a dozen men in important government positions were convicted of several bribery-related crimes. ABSCA M's success, however, raised several important questions regarding the limits to which such investigations may go to achieve these goals. This final section of this note will deal with these questions and some of the answers which have been suggested. Several of the opinion-writing ABSCAM judges voiced their disapproval of certain undercover investigatory techniques.'" The Alexandra court, speaking in general terms, maintained that at the heart of our democracy rests the principle that all individuals are protected from governmental overreaching and that "the end cannot justify the means."3 " The Kelly district court, more specific in its protest, wrote, "even if a victim successfully invoked the [due process and entrapment] defenses ... this would be of little solace to him, for he nevertheless has been destroyed as a voice in public affairs." 3 "
The concern expressed by these courts is related to Senator Williams' defense regarding the anti-Kennedy conspiracy. 322 Although the Williams court held that the accusations had no basis in reality, 323 the possibility exists that an ABSCAM-type investigation could be focused upon a particular individual for reasons unrelated to the detection of criminal activity."' Thus, the ramifications relate not only to personal vendettas but even to the balance of power between the branches of the federal government. 325
In light of these concerns, the United States Attorney General's office has promulgated specific guidelines for FBI undercover operations. 325 Several of these guidelines specifically address some of the problems inherent in the ABSCAM investigation. 3 " Gut DELINES, Sllpra note 326, at 13-14. Paragraph J. "Authorization of the creation of opportunities for Illegal Activities," provides in full:
(1) Entrapment. should he scrupulously avoided. Ent rapment is the inducement or encouragement of an individual to engage in illegal activity in which he would otherwise not be disposed to engage.
(2) In addition to complying with any legal requirements, before approving an undercover operation involving an invitation to engage in illegal activity, the approving authority should be satisfied that (a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through (b) There is a reasonable indication that the undercover operation will reveal illegal activities; and (c) The nature of any inducement is not unjustifiable in view of the character of the illegal transaction in which the individual is invited to engage.
(3) Under the law of entrapment, inducements may be offered to an individual even though there is no reasonable indication that that particular individual had engaged, or is engaging, in the illegal activity that is properly under investigation. Nonetheless, no such undercover operation shall be approved without the specific written authorization of the Director, unless the Undercover Operations Review Committee determines, ... insofar as practicable, that either (a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through informants or other means, that the subject is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activity of a similar type; or (b) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there is reason for believing that persons drawn to the opportunity, or brought ID it, are predisposed to engage in the contemplated illegal activity.
[Vol. 25:351 guideline focuses on the requirement of prior suspicion of targets'"" The Guidelines require that agents make no offers or inducements without specific written authorization from the Director of the FBI or unless there is reasonable indication that the subject has engaged in, is engaged in, or is likely to engage in_slich a crime_or that the subject is clearly predisposed to such crimes as can be evidenced by the structure of the inducement." 28
The Guidelines also require that the corrupt nature of the inducement be made clear and specific,33° thus alleviating the problem presented by middlemen who misrepresent the inducement. In addition, the Guidelines require that the actual decision to offer an illegal inducement should be made solely on law enforcement considerations. 33 ' Finally, the Guidelines address the possible confusion which may result in combination legal/illegal offers. The Guidelines require that the corrupt nature of the activity must be reasonably clear, that there be a reasonable indication that a corresponding illegal activity will follow on the part of the subject and that the inducement itself must not be unjustifiably attractive in view of the overall illegal transaction. 332 The Justice Department hoped that by establishing standards "significantly more restrictive" than the standards of entrapment or due process enforced by the courts, 3 these Guidelines would reduce the likelihood that FBI investigations would entrap their targets.
Congress has also taken a close look at the ABSCAM investigation and FB1 investiga:
Lions in general."'" The Senate Select Committee on Justice Department Activities has addressed itself to a number of the problems of the ABSCAM investigation, paying particular attention to the reliability of middlemen. 335 The committee has considered recommending that middleman reliability be tested under the same light that an informant's word is considered in requesting a search warrant. 336 In addition, the committee may rectify the problems relating to a lack of prior suspicion by requiring that the FBI obtain a court order based on "reasonable suspicion" before investigating any individual. 3 " Other recommendations being considered by Congress include the requirement of a warrant for electronic monitoring, amendment of the federal bribery law to clarify entrapment standards, modification of FBI and justice Department internal controls, and a requirement that all undercover operation inducements be modeled after real world temptations. 33 " Should any or all of these recommendations come to fruition, it is evident that they could only help resolve the various obstacles encountered by the ABSCAM defendants, especially in terms of protecting those for whom no prior suspicion exists.
ABSCAM did have at least one scenario, the Alexandra case, involving the corrupt Immigration Service official, which proved to be an efficient and responsible attempt to achieve ABSCAM's purposes without adversely affecting the defendant's personal rights. 339 Although its design was based on the simple asylum scenario, the investigation was conducted so as to involve certain elements missing from the other scenarios. These elements should set. the very standards by winch all future bribery scams should be conducted.
One element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario from other ABSCAM scenarios is that Alexandro was presented to the agents through only one middleman; a man who bad worked with Alexanclro in the past and could attest to some form of clear, criminal disposition. 34° Such familiarity between middlemen and targets is essential for several reasons: First, it minimizes the lack of control which the agents can have over a middleman, as exhibited by the diluted link between the agents and Congressman Kelly in his case. 34 ' Second, it allows for more accurate testimony regarding the target's predisposition, thus supplementing the physical, video evidence with evidence of state of mind.
Third, it• lessens the potential that the offer itself will be misrepresented.
A second element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario is that Alexandro was never presented with anything but an illegal offer. 3 ' 2 In this way, the government lessens the likelihood that the offer will be misunderstood, and that the target himself will be able to console his conscience with the notion that illegality is only a small means to achieve a greater, completely legal, end. Of course, using only illegal offers creates a greater risk that the middleman may be turned in to the authorities by the target, but this also insures that the middleman will seek Out only those targets who he really believes will be open to his proposals, and hence, be predisposed.
A third element which distinguishes the Alexandra scenario is that Alexandro was required to take an active role in planning the illegal activity. 343 Unlikely many of the other ABSCAM defendants, Alexandro actually volunteered not only a list of the services he could provide the sheik, but also a -price fOr them."' This conduct demonstrated a clear understanding of the criminal nature of the deal, and an active and enthusiastic desire to participate in commission of a crime. 3 a 5 Thus, proof of predisposition was based not on the commission of the act, but. on a premeditated desire to proceed with the act . 3"
The final element which set the Alexandra scenario apart from the others is that.
Alexandro was not offered any money until after he had displayed his active interest in proceeding with the criminal aCliVil y.34' With this method of bribery, there is little chance that the defendant is trying to "swindle the sheik" by not keeping his promise, 346 and it certainly dismisses the possibility that the target was investigating his i n vestigators . 349 The mere passage of time seems to work in favor of justice. Each of the other ABSCAM defendants was faced with virtual ultimatums to either rake the money now or forego it.
Perhaps if they had been given more time to consider the offer, or better yet, if they had been given the opportunity to show their sincerity by actually introducing the immigration bill, their clear intent and predisposition would then be irrefutable.
Thus, the strenghts of the Alexandra scenario illuminated A BSCAM's most grievous weakness. To overcome claims of entrapment, the government must. establish that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Yet many of the techniques used in ABSCAM suggest that the government, rather than the defendants, may have supplied the willingness to commit the crime. Confidence man Weinberg, in testimony taken from the Schwartz trial, boasted, "we had a honey pot and the flies came."' Although this is undoubtedly the way ABSCAM was designed to operate, there is considerable doubt about its basis in fact."' This, therefore, is the crux of the ABSCAM entrapment dilemma: Entrapment occurs when the government manufactures a crime and the manner through which it disproves this allegation is the proof of predisposition. 352 In ABSCAM, the government showed that it had the ability to ferret out corruption. As the jannotti dissent put it, "if sufficiently attractive monetary and civic inducements are dangled, there are fish who will bite." 353 Unfortunately, as the dissent continued, this "does not demonstrate that the fish were predisposed to take the bait." 3 " CONCLUSION ABSCAM was not the FBI's first corruption investigation."'" Nor is it likely to he its last. It is therefore necessary that the FBI and the courts carefully reevaluate ABSCAM and the problems that it presented.
The ABSCAM investigation resulted in the indictment of over a dozen politicallyinfluential individuals, all of whom have been found guilty. 356 Each of these defendants pleaded an entrapment or due process defense. 357 It has been submitted, however, that the subjective theory of entrapment was unavailable to the ABSCAM defendants because of the selection procedure employed by the FBI.'" This procedure effectively limited the "" This was alleged in both United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 377 n.58, and United States v.
Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 38-39.
33° United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1226.
3" Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals contended, "The party was by invitation only; when the guests came to the pot it was not necessary for them to ask for a sample; rather, their mouths were opened for them and the honey poured down their gullets." United States v. Jannoni, 673 F.2d at 613 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). government's proof of disposition to the "on the spot" video coverage, thus considerably devaluing any standard oral testimony which could dissuade a finding of predisposition.559 As long as the subjective theory is the test to be applied, random selection investigations like ABSCAM will be no-win situations for the defendants.
It has also been submitted that clue to federal precedents rejecting the objective theory of entrapment, it also presents little chance of acquittal.u° This unavailability of the objective theory goes hand-in-hand with the problems courts faced in deciding claims that government conduct was sufficiently outrageous to violate the defendants' due process rights."' Many courts simply refused to consider such claims, treating them as if they were merely the objective theory of entrapment in another form. 362 More importantly, the courts which did decide to consider these claims found no suitable tests, standards or precedents to be applied in bribery-type cases. 383 Defendants who alleged these defenses, therefore, fared poorly.
Structurally, ABSCAM was flawed. As long as modern entrapment and due process law remain as they are, random selection bribery investigations which employ unsuspecting middlemen and videotape evidence will remain fundamentally inequitable. Although few courts could specifically connect these inequities with a particular due process or entrapment claim, most courts strongly urged that the FBI and all law enforcement agencies must structure future investigations differently."' Whether this will be done because of Attorney General Guidelines, Congressional recommendations or some other bureaucratic or legislative mandates has yet to be decided, but it seems evident from the suggestions made so far t hat the goal of the restructuring must be a greater respect for the rights of the individual targets of the investigations. Policing agencies and reviewing courts must consider a careful balance; they must weigh the need to expose political corruption against the costs such exposure will levy against innocent parties. In doing so, they must always bear in mind Justice Holmes' observation that "it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part. 
